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From Integration to Competition: 
Britain, Germany and the EU’s New Group Dynamics 
Roderick Parkes 
ome European governments, most vocally Athens and Budapest, complain about being bullied 
by the EU’s strong political centre. Others, core members like Paris, talk of being taken for a 
ride by a weak periphery. Such language may be unusually shrill in the trajectory of European 
integration,  but  the  tensions  it  reflects  are  typical  of  any  group  whose  members  are  mutually 
dependent. Sociological research on group dynamics highlights how easily the EU, a setup created to 
pursue  closer  integration,  might  become  an  arena  for  competition  for  ‘dominance’  between  its 
members. The clash between the German and British governments in December 2011 and again in 
March 2012 provides a case study of this emerging political dynamic between the EU’s core members 
and the outliers.  
Differences of size and wealth between states have been a traditional source of conflict in Europe. In a 
continent of limited space and resources, smaller and poorer countries have long relied on larger ones 
to achieve even basic domestic goals. This situation of uneven dependence led to disparities in power, 
with some countries easily able to overcome the resistance of others in pursuing their own priorities.
1 
These disparities in power in turn facilitated the emergence of situations of dominance, described as 
actors “wanting to have leadership powers – but with no care for others, no reciprocal appreciation 
from them, and no wish to comply with their social norms”.
2 The pre-EU Europe, in other words, 
followed  a  dynamic  typical  of  many  social  groups  in  which  differences  in  dependence  lead  to 
disparities of power, which lead to situations of dominance, which in turn lead to conflict. 
European integration aims to recalibrate these imbalances and defuse their conflict potential. It does so 
via two mechanisms. The first is to turn situations of unidirectional dependence between states into 
relations of mutual dependence. All member states agree to share political competencies, meaning that 
larger countries share sovereignty with smaller and weaker ones. This was the founding idea of the 
European  Coal  and  Steel  Community,  for  example,  in  which  a  pooling  of  sovereignty  prevented 
individual  states  from  using  their  resources  as  a  source  of  leverage  over  others,  in  this  case  by 
rearming. The second mechanism, by contrast, builds on the age-old assumption that if resources are 
abundantly available to all, situations of dependence, dominance and conflict will be reduced. Wealth 
creation  is  thus  the  key.  This  is  the  founding  premise  of  the  EU’s  internal  market,  but  also  the 
                                                       
1 The idea that power is relative and can best be measured in the relations between actors is a staple of the 
literature on ‘power-dependence relations’. See Richard M. Emerson, “Power-dependence relations”, American 
Sociological Review, Vol. 27, No. 1, 1962, pp. 31-41. 
2 Floyd Rudmin, “Dominance, social control, and ownership: A history and cross-cultural study of motivations 
for private property”, Journal of Cross-Cultural Research, 22, 1988, p. 149.  
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Schengen passport-free travel area (originally designed to reduce the costs of the transporting goods) 
and the common currency. 
Both mechanisms are neatly illustrated by the ideas currently being presented to resolve the eurozone 
crisis. Firstly, there is an emerging agenda on wealth creation and growth based on a deepening of the 
internal market. This has focused, amongst other things, on increasing market interpenetration and 
competition in the EU’s energy market, on the contribution of the digital economy to cross-border 
trade  and  on  the  negative  effects  of  EU  regulation  on  growth  amongst  small  and  medium-sized 
businesses. Second there have been moves towards greater political integration between the member 
states even on sensitive domestic affairs such as budgetary discipline (the introduction of deficit rules 
into national constitutional law and semi-automatic sanctions on deficits) as well as a strengthening of 
common institutions established in order to overcome tensions between the small and the large – the 
European Commission and the European Court of Justice. Political sovereignty is being pooled in 
pursuit of stronger common norms. 
Power-dependence relations 
The twin logics of EU integration are usually viewed as complementary: it is impossible to create 
common goods such as the internal market without strong, shared norms. European liberalisation thus 
causes spill-over effects and interdependencies which must in turn be regulated. And yet, in reality, 
this two-part model has proved rather divisive, as witnessed by a series of bad-tempered European 
Council meetings on the resolution of the euro-crisis. The strains at a juncture such as this are easily 
explained, of course. At a time of financial crisis, competition for resources returns, leading states to 
favour unilateralism, protectionism and maximum room for manoeuvre. Yet, such an explanation does 
not actually account for the precise pattern of behaviour on the part of the member states. Rather than 
favouring unilateralism and protectionism, the member states are all pushing for a common European 
approach.  Yet,  there  is  a  heavy  polarisation  between  the  two  pillars  of  integration,  and  the  EU 
members have become divided into two relatively distinct camps, each aggressively advocating one 
‘common approach’ and rejecting the other. 
The growth agenda has been whole-heartedly supported by liberal-minded states in the Nordic, Baltic 
and  Eastern  periphery.
3  The  common  regulatory  approach,  by  contrast,  is  supported  by  core 
northwestern member countries. And both have been associated with a particular champion  – the 
growth agenda with the UK, which coordinated the presentation of a joint letter on growth ahead of 
the March summit, and the regulatory approach with Germany. The increasing competition between 
the two agendas is highlighted by the current perilous state of Anglo-German relations. In December 
2011, the British government famously tried to block Germany’s moves to reinforce rules on fiscal 
and economic discipline. And in March 2012, Berlin returned the favour by seeking to dilute moves 
towards a deepening of the internal market, particularly in the services sector. And, whilst both have 
articulated  support  for  a  dual  approach  recognising  the  need  for  both  liberal  wealth  creation  and 
greater discipline, the way each has formulated its priorities in the pillar of its choice has been highly 
antagonistic to the other. 
This odd pattern of behaviour suggests a deeper logic of interaction. For students of ‘group dynamics’, 
that logic is easily identified. The two mechanisms behind EU integration lend themselves to two 
competing strategies of social dominance within a close-knit group – a loosening of relations (in this 
case through wealth creation that reduces competition for resources), and a strengthening of ties (in 
this  case  through  common  EU  rules).  Seen  in  this  way,  European  integration  has  not  overcome 
situations of dominance and conflict but rather made them more complex. By creating a situation in 
which advantages do not obviously fall to large, rich, central states, but rather in which smaller, poorer 
and more peripheral states can also play a role, the EU framework encourages a constant struggle for 
                                                       
3 “David Cameron and EU leaders call for growth plan in Europe: full letter”, Telegraph online, 20 February 
2012  (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/9093478/David-Cameron-and-EU-leaders-call-for-
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the upper hand between its members. This is power-dependence theory in which members of a group 
use the situation of mutual dependence between them in order to accrue advantages vis-à-vis their 
partners. Since power only exists relative to other actors, each EU member has a strong interest in the 
Community remaining whole, but only because that gives it the chance of shifting the balance in its 
own favour. 
Critics  of  recent  German  European  policy  have  indeed  been  quick  to  identify  the  drive  to  agree 
common rules and regulations as an effort to achieve some kind of ‘dominance’ (again, defined simply 
as influence without the requisite readiness for compromise). The idea that this reflects some kind of 
German strategy is overblown of course, but if Berlin’s success at ‘norm transfer’ does lend itself to 
some measure of ‘dominance-through-conformism’,
4 outlier states’ demand for a greater respect of 
‘individualism’ is very much in the same vein. The individualist approach, inherent in the liberalism of 
projects  such  as  the  internal  market,  can,  as  Richard  Schlatter  has  noted,  also  be  a  dominance 
strategy.
5 Liberalism offers its proponents a means of protecting themselves from interference whilst 
intervening in the affairs of others. Liberal rights of privacy and of property, principles of subsidiarity 
and clear demarcations of sovereignty are a means of protecting one’s own dominion and confining 
others to theirs. But by pushing for drastic rights of exchange and competition in certain carefully 
defined areas, liberals can dominate other group members in those domains where they themselves 
have a competitive advantage. 
For students of group dynamics, in which conformism and individualism are the most commonly 
observed strategies of dominance, it should come as no surprise to find similar patterns in recent EU 
relations. The joint letter on stimulating EU growth and deepening the internal market, which was 
signed by 12 European leaders in the run-up to the March 2012 summit and spearheaded by the British 
Prime Minister, focused on liberalising those areas such as labour market regulation, financial services 
and information technology where many of the signatories have a perceived competitive advantage. 
For their part, those countries like Germany which favour a more heavily regulatory approach, have 
resisted deeper liberalisation in the service economy, instead mooting common rules, not least the 
introduction of a European tax on financial transactions. Their liberal critics have in turn rejected such 
proposals calling them targeted, hostile moves, and the regulatory bloc has for its part resisted the 
focus on liberalisation, preferring instead the theme of fiscal discipline and mutual oversight.  
The shifting balance between liberal and regulatory states 
In a mutually dependent community, the situation is never static, and actors constantly seek to effect a 
rebalancing in their favour. For liberal actors, the most basic means of loosening the grip of their 
interfering,  conformist  partners  is  disengagement.  By  distancing  themselves  from  the  rest  of  the 
community, they try to shift the fulcrum of influence in their own favour. In its least sophisticated 
form, this will see actors that have been unhappily pushed into rules reassess their values and begin 
skimping on implementation (what Richard Emerson calls “withdrawal”
6). Non-implementation turns 
the tables on the regulators, who are not prepared to follow suit and ignore their own rules, leaving 
them bound whilst others free-ride. This tactic has been activated most notably by Greece, in which 
non-implementation  has  become  a  reaction  to  unfavourable  EU  rules.  Yet,  it  is  an  avenue  that 
jeopardises the continued existence of the community, and is thus usually avoided. Most liberals resort 
instead to ‘network extension’, Emerson’s second tactic.  
                                                       
4 Both ‘dominance’ and ‘conformism’ are loaded terms in the context of EU integration, especially at the current 
political juncture. There is thus a danger of applying to a complex political setup such as the EU this sociological 
terminology typically used of other, less significant or less politically-charged social groups. The terminology is 
used in the present essay with that caveat in mind. 
5 Richard Schlatter, Private Property: The History of an Idea, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers, 1951. 
6 Emerson, op. cit., p. 36. 4 | RODERICK PARKES 
Network  extension  involves  identifying  allies  outside  the  group  who  could  provide  an alternative 
means of realising goals usually pursued together with the group. The aim is not actually to cooperate 
with an external partner, but rather to disrupt the balance within the group. Eastern member states have 
long pursued this tactic, looking to transatlantic cooperation as a means of reducing their reliance on 
the EU’s political core, and thus making the core work hard to get them on board. And it has been 
practiced in a more sophisticated form by the UK in the euro-crisis. London has not only stressed its 
lack of responsibilities in the European debt crisis, citing its non-membership of the euro. During his 
November 2011 visit to Berlin, Cameron also sought to confer upon Germany a special status and 
responsibility for solving the bloc’s problems, thereby preventing Germany from distancing itself from 
the  rescue  attempts.  London  was  combining  network  extension  with  the  third  of  Emerson’s 
techniques, “conferral of status” – a ploy that enhances “the weaker member’s power to control the 
formerly  more  powerful  member  through  increasing  the  latter’s  motivational  investment  in  the 
relation”.
7 
Individualist tactics are, however, highly risky. By distancing themselves from the critical mass of 
cooperation, individualist actors invite exclusion. This plays into the hands of conformist actors, which 
can put themselves in a position of influence. By investing in the norms that govern the EU’s common 
goods, conformist or regulatory states gain increased control over rights of access and membership, 
allowing them to exploit rights of participation as a source of leverage. This applies most obviously to 
their power over aspirant members of the bloc – in the case of the EU, by defining the rules attached to 
the accession process. But it also applies to actors that are formally members, that have rights of parity 
and  equal  participation,  but  dislike  the  idea  of  regulation.  By  demanding  from  all  parties  active 
commitment to the rules pertaining to the common good, conformist actors can effectively consign 
more hesitant actors to second-class membership. 
The most obvious means of achieving this hold over other member states who enjoy formal parity is 
Emerson’s  fourth  technique,  namely  “coalition  formation”.  A  coalition,  Emerson  says,  “is 
characterised by the fact that (a) its common environment is […] to be controlled and (b) its unity is 
historically based upon efforts to achieve that control”. The coalition parties – call them actors A and 
B – tend however to see this dominance in rather abstract and apolitical terms and “instead of having 
the control of actor C as its end, the group attempts to control actor C in the interest of achieving X, 
some ‘group goal.’”
8 In other words, regulatory states can seek out partnerships with like-minded 
actors, forming a dominant coalition which exploits the language of integration and the common good 
in a rather exclusionary manner. Although this option is also available to individualists, regulatory 
states often have the advantage for the simple reason that – almost by definition – individualist states 
are unlikely to forge stable relations with one another.  
Much of the recent criticism heaped upon Berlin has indeed focused on its coalition relationship with 
France  (the  so-called  ‘Germance’  between  Chancellor  Merkel  and  President  Sarkozy)  and  the 
suspicion that the pair has taken ownership of the integration process in a rather exclusionary and 
divisive way. But it is not the first time other member states have been asked to make the choice 
between active commitment and exclusion. The example of the 2005 Prüm Treaty saw a small avant 
garde of EU states led by a northwestern core agree to home affairs commitments on subjects such as 
data exchange and combating illegal immigration, which were actually replicated in existing proposals 
for EU rules. The protagonists stressed that their aim was to integrate the Prüm commitments into EU 
law – resorting to an avant-garde grouping of pro-European states in order to overcome blockages in 
the usual EU process. Yet, those EU member states which had not felt able to commit to the avant-
garde,  found  themselves  subsequently  integrating  the  Prüm  provisions  one-to-one  into  EU  law, 
                                                       
7 Emerson, op. cit., p. 39. 
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without the usual rights of discussion. EU integration was thus driven forward, but only in a very 
narrow and formalistic sense.
9  
Conclusions: Integrating difference 
European  integration  aims  to  turn  uneven  relations  of  dependent  states  into  a  situation  of  more 
equitable and growing mutual dependence. This occurs via the creation of liberal common goods, 
designed to increase exchange, stability and prosperity within the bloc. It is also realised via the 
creation of common rules and a pooling of sovereignty. Yet, these two logics can push in very rather 
directions, one loosening the bonds between members, the other increasing them. This in turn opens 
the door to two different strategies of competition on the part of states. The liberalism inherent in the 
creation of shared goods such as the internal market lends itself to ‘individualism’ in which members 
loosen  relations  except  in  areas  that  favour  them,  and  the  agreement  of  common  norms  to 
‘conformism’ in which members export domestic rules. Rather than merely hosting a classic struggle 
between large and small, rich and poor, then, the EU is also home to a more complex and multi-
dimensional struggle between liberal and regulatory states.  
If the style of interaction in the EU has shifted markedly in the past year away from integration and in 
favour  of  competition,  it  is  likely  due  to  a  growing  intolerance  towards  differences  displayed  by 
governments. Integration, after all, is based upon each party recognising the different positions and 
qualities of partners and seeking to combine these into a whole. Dominance, by contrast, is essentially 
cooperation without compromise. The sharp tone taken by governments about one another suggests 
that the respect for difference that is necessary for real integration is in short supply. Any resulting 
shift to ‘conformism’, in which states attempt to transfer their own norms to the rest of the group, 
marks a failure to see that integration and difference are the same thing: “With the integration of 
differences, something new is created that never has existed before”.
10 An unwillingness to accept a 
new, shared mode of behaviour thus drives conformism. Yet, for all their talk of individualism as a 
necessary  principle  for  the  respect  of  differences  within  the  EU,  liberal  states  can  also  fall  into 
intolerance. This form of liberalism “is an attempt at atomistic living; the desires, purposes, standards, 
values, welfare of others do not count; it is rugged individualism of a highly ingrowing order.”
11 
Individualism, in its negative sense, is about a fear of, rather than a respect for, other’s differences.  
                                                       
9 Daniela Kietz and Andreas Maurer (2006), “From Schengen to Prüm: Deeper integration through enhanced 
cooperation or signs of fragmentation in the EU?”, SWP Comments C15, SWp, Berlin. 
10 Harold Anderson, “An examination of the concepts of domination and integration in relation to dominance and 
ascendance”, Psychological Review, Vol. 47(1), 1940, p. 23. 
11 Ibid., p. 22. About EPIN 
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